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Turkish Foreign Policy Toward
the Algerian War of Independence
(1954–62)
EYÜP ERSOY
Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Turkey
ABSTRACT Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62) was
construed as persistent Turkish endorsement of official French positions generating abiding
resentment among the states of the Third World, especially Arab states, and understandably
in Algeria, which was to elicit backlashes from the Third World states thereafter consequently
causing substantial complications in Turkish foreign policy. Stressing the importance of incor-
porating nonmaterial and ideational factors in analyses of foreign policy, two arguments are
put forward in this article for an accurate explanation of Turkish foreign policy toward Alger-
ian War of Independence. First, it was the conception of the West, defined not only in strategic
or military terms, but also in ideational and civilizational terms that induced Turkish policy-
makers to adopt insular policies regarding Algeria. Second, a “temporal contextualization” of
Turkish foreign policy during the Algerian War of Independence is required for a proper
understanding of Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence.
Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), or
Guerre d’Algérie, both in public declarations, in discussions and related voting in
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly over the issue of Algerian self-
determination and independence was construed as persistent Turkish endorsement
of official French positions both by the Turkish, French, and Algerian politicians
and, accordingly, generated abiding resentment among the states of the Third
World, especially Arab states, and understandably in Algeria, in that early period
of the Cold War. Turkish Western-oriented foreign policy attitude during the
period was to elicit backlashes from the Third World states thereafter, which
consequently caused substantial complications in Turkish foreign policy.
In the mid-1960s, Turkish foreign policy-makers bitterly realized the existence and
the extent of Turkey’s isolation in world politics when Turkey abruptly encountered
the exigency of obtaining international support. The dispute over the future of Cyprus
came to the forefront of Turkish foreign policy in a short period of time, and in the
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absence of unequivocal support from its traditional Western allies over the issue, and
in fact experiencing the adversity of the Johnson Letter, the support of the Third
World states became crucial for Turkey, especially in the UN. At this juncture, the
legacy of its foreign policy toward the Third World haunted Turkey and was to belea-
guer its foreign policies for a long time to come.
Turkey’s attitude toward the Algerian War of Independence constitutes an interest-
ing case. In December 1958, in the voting of a resolution calling for negotiations
between France and Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne
(GPRA), in the UN General Assembly, Turkey and the US both abstained. Both
the French and Algerian leaders construed the abstention of the US as a loss of
support for the French position. While for the French UN representative, as Connelly
indicated,
there is little doubt that it [Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)] has gained a
good deal on the international level and in all the countries of the world where it
has sent missions, especially the United States and the United Nations
for Ferhad Abbas, the president of the GPRA, “the US abstention was ‘incontestably
a success . . . encouraging the Algerians’ efforts to exploit the escalating ‘war of
nerves’ between the putative allies”.1 Interestingly enough, on the other hand, the
Turkish abstention was construed as diplomatic support for the French position by
both the French and the Algerian leadership as their subsequent private and public
statements, appreciative on the French part and resentful on the Algerian part, demon-
strate. This discrepant interpretation of the same action, abstention in the voting, can
be attributed to the policy expectations of the parties in terms of Turkish foreign
policy since, prima facie, the parties would have expected a rather explicit pro-Alger-
ian Turkish diplomatic position for a couple of reasons.
First of all, Turkey is the first country that waged a triumphant war of independence
against colonial powers of the time. During the Turkish War of Independence (1919–
23), there was widespread interest and support, if not material but moral only, among
the Turkish leadership for anti-colonial and national independence movements
abroad. For example, in an interview he gave to The New York Herald on January
23, 1923, Mustafa Kemal Paşa expressed that permanent peace and disarmament is
achievable “on the sole condition that the statesmen of Great Powers learn to
admit that all nations, big or small, have equal rights to independence and
development”.2 To Mustafa Kemal Paşa, the cause Turkey defended was the cause
of all oppressed nations, and Turkish success in its struggle would serve as a
model for the struggles of “Eastern” nations for independence.3 In fact, Turkish
success in repudiating colonial rule and tutelage through armed struggle had reper-
cussions abroad.
In China, for example, in the 1920s there were serious disagreements between the
Chinese government led by the Chinese nationalists (Kuomintang/KMT) and the
imperial powers over issues pertinent to Chinese sovereignty, such as tariff autonomy































the discussions between the parties over such contentious issues, one of the two
events “which greatly stiffened the attitude of the Chinese nationalists towards the
powers” was “the cavalier manner with which the Turkish Nationalists had treated
the Powers and practically compelled them to sign the Treaty of Lausanne”.4
However, two decades later, in its foreign policy, Turkey opted for an alignment
with France against the Algerian independence movement, which espoused virtually
the same anti-colonial nationalist ideology, if not methods, of Turkish struggle for
independence while the leaders of the Algerian national liberation movement
invoked, at least at the onset of the movement, the Turkish experience. Messali
Hadj, as an example, who was a prominent personality especially in the early
phase of the independence movement, stated in an informal meeting with the
Turkish journalist Faruk Demirtaş, in 1951 that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was an inspi-
ration for the Muslim world and they tied the path of their movement to the path of
Atatürk.5
The second reason that would make Turkey’s attitude toward the Algerian War of
Independence a wonder is the fact that Algeria was under Ottoman rule until French
forces invasion in 1830; it was not directly ruled from Istanbul, and was a tributary
state tough. Furthermore, the Turkish struggle for independence was in part carried
out against occupying French forces in southern Turkey.6 In other words, during
the Algerian War of Independence, contrary to one would have expected, Turkey
affiliated its policy against the independence movement of a people once under its
rule with the policy of a colonial state against which Turkey carried out its own inde-
pendence movement, though Algeria was not a French colony but was constitution-
ally a part of France. As the third reason, even though religion was not a criterion in
foreign policy decision-making in the Cold War, the parties would have expected a
Turkish demonstration of solidarity with the Algerian independence movement on
religious grounds as the widespread discourse of jihad in Algeria and the Algerian
mujahideen in the Turkish media and among the Turkish public would have
suggested.
This line of reasoning and the subsequent expectation of Turkish support and the
consequent disillusionment with its policy were starkly evident in the somewhat acri-
monious response of Houari Boumediène to the question of a Turkish journalist in
June 1965, just after the bloodless coup he staged that toppled Ahmed Ben Bella
and brought him to power. As one of the most important leaders of the Algerian
national liberation movement who held several high-ranking posts within the Front
de Libération Nationale (FLN), and ultimately became the President of Algeria in
1965, Boumediène’s response can be considered representative of the general percep-
tion among the leadership of FLN of the Turkish policy. Turkish journalist Lütfü
Akdoğan was curious about the relations of Algeria with Turkey in the future. Bou-
mediène responded:
We are resentful of and offended by Turkey. This does not mean that we will
declare war against Turkey. As you know, Turkey has always sided with the






























French in our struggle. We suffered a great deal in the United Nations. But in
fact, Turkey is Muslim and ruled here for 300 years.7
However, contrary to the expectations of the Algerian leadership, and, in general, to
the frustration of Third World states and at the expense of alienating them, Turkey
proved itself as a staunch ally of the West, and as a result, of France during the Alger-
ian War of Independence. This article addresses the underlying dynamics of Turkish
policy during that period and attempts to provide a general framework for an under-
standing of Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence. The
key to this attempt is to discuss the conditionality of Turkish foreign policy at the
time, in general, and the temporality of Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the Algerian
War of Independence, in particular.
Turkey’s heavily and exclusively Western-oriented foreign policy in the aftermath
of World War II made all its relations with non-Western parts of the world conditional
on its relations with the West. This might either be a deliberate policy of Turkish
policy-makers or a spontaneous derivative of Cold War politics. Conditionality influ-
enced Turkish policy toward the Algerian War of Independence in two ways. First,
since France was a member of the West, and its putative embodiment the NATO,
Turkish policy-makers decided to align Turkey with France, which was considered
a fellow European state. Second, this conditionality affected understandings and atti-
tudes of Turkish policy-makers toward the decolonization process, and shaped
Turkish foreign policy with regard to it. The Algerian national liberation movement
was a part of three intertwined decolonization processes, that is, French, African, and
global, and thus Turkish policy toward it was susceptible to the Turkish policy toward
the decolonization process.
With regard to temporality, the Algerian War of Independence took place between
1954 and 1962. This was a period between Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952 and
the dispatch of the infamous letter of the US President Lyndon Johnson in 1964.
These constituted two temporal junctures, which arguably characterized the advent and
the end of the most Western-oriented period of Turkish foreign policy in the Cold War.
In the first part of the article, a detailed account of Turkish foreign policy toward
the Algerian War of Independence is provided. In the second part, the conditionality
issue is discussed in great detail, and it is contended that it was the conception of the
West, defined not only in strategic or military terms, but also in ideational and civi-
lizational terms that induced Turkish policy-makers to adopt insular policies regard-
ing non-Western “parts” of the world. In brief, it was not only the state of affairs but
also the state of mind that determined Turkish foreign policy toward the Algerian War
of Independence. In the third part, the temporality issue is addressed by discussing the
significance of Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952 and the Johnson Letter of 1964 for
Turkish foreign policy orientation in the Cold War, and contends that this sort of a
“temporal contextualization” is required for a proper understanding of Turkish
foreign policy toward the Algerian War of Independence. The conclusion stresses
































Algerian War of Independence and Turkish Policy
It is generally accepted that the Algerian War of Independence began on November 1,
1954 when the FLN rebels launched several attacks in various parts of Algeria against
a wide array of civilian and military targets, and when the proclamation of the FLN
was distributed in pamphlets across Algeria and in radio transmissions across the
region calling for “indépendence nationale par la restauration de l’Etat algérien sou-
verain démocratique et social dans le cadre des principes islamiques”.8 However,
grandiose the proclamation was, these initial attacks were “largely unsuccessful,
neither causing severe damage nor arousing much fervor among Algerian
Muslims”.9 Still, the French reaction was zealous as the Mendès-France Government
in France was immediately incontrovertible in its condemnation of the revolt, and its
resolve to repress it. On November 5, François Mitterrand, Minister of the Interior in
the Mendès-France administration declared: “Algeria is France; from Flanders to the
Congo there is only one law, one nation, one parliament. The Constitution wills it so,
we will it so ... La seule négotiation, c’est la guerre [War is the only negotiation]”.10
On November 12, Mendès-France addressed the French Assembly unequivocally
One does not compromise when it comes to defending the internal peace of the
nation, the unity and the integrity of the Republic. The Algerian departments
are part of the French Republic . . . Between them and metropolitan France
there can be no conceivable secession . . . Ici, c’est la France! [Here/Algeria,
this is France].11
With the action of the FLN and the reaction of France, both equally fervent and
intransigent at this stage, a vicious cycle of revolutionary war commenced in Algeria.
The clashes between the FLN rebels and the French forces immediately found
repercussions in the Turkish media. The tone of the news was pro-Algerian as the
rebels were referred to as nationalists and, by stressing the French use of heavy weap-
onry; an excessive use of force by France was implied.12 It was reported, for example,
on November 22 that “nationalists surrounded by the French paratroopers around the
Algeria-Tunisia border succeeded in breaking the encirclement with a great deal of
dexterity and caused heavy casualties on the French”.13 A couple of months after
the outbreak of the clashes in Algeria, a French parliamentary delegation visited
Turkey. In a press conference, the head of the delegation, Gaston Palewski,
explained, among others, the French position on Algeria to the Turkish audience
that the French were against granting independence to the masses of people that
had yet to achieve a character of nationhood and this was against justice. Responding
to a question of a journalist about the proper designation of “mujahideen” fighting in
Algeria, a member of the delegation stated that the fighters were brigands in a small
area and yet they considered any riot a rebellion in terms of the integrity of France.14
One of the “objectifs extérieurs” of the FLN in its proclamation was the “internal-
isation du problème algérien” and to that end while continuing its military struggle in
Algeria, the FLN was making persistent efforts in its diplomatic struggle in world






























politics. As its “most outstanding feat of internalization”, the FLN achieved an invi-
tation to attend the Bandung Conference of April 1955 of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment representing the emerging Third World, which “adopted unanimously an
Egyptian motion proclaiming Algeria’s right to independence, and called upon
France to implement this forthwith”.15 With this diplomatic success, the road to
the UN was opened for the FLN. In September 1955, the Algerian problem was to
be formally inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly by a single vote.
Turkey, among the other 26 states, voted against the petition while 27 states voted
in favor of it and five states abstained.16
With Morocco and Tunisia gaining “independence within interdependence” in
February 1956, the prospects for Algerian independence for the FLN, increased,
and the FLN, while continuing the guerrilla war in the countryside, decided to accel-
erate the process by bringing the fight to cities ushering in a new and savage episode
in the rebellion that was to be called “the battle of Algiers”. This bloody episode was
another step in the internalization of the Algerian problem since, as Ruedy contends,
the battle of Algiers
riveted world attention for the first time upon the Algerian struggle and ... for
the first time, many of its issues home to the public in France. In the long run,
international pressures and a disillusioned French public opinion would be the
key factors forcing the French state to accept Algerian independence.17
However, the Turkish policy-makers had no interest in pressuring France. On the
contrary, in his meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes on Decem-
ber 20, 1957, the French Prime Minister Felix Gaillard thanked his Turkish counter-
part for Turkish attitude on the issue of Algeria.18 On the other hand, the FLN for the
first time asked for the Turkish assistance in achieving independence through a
message delivered to the Turkish Embassy in Cairo and requested that Turkey, as
a member of the Baghdad Pact, use its influence on France.19
The political instability of the Fourth Republic culminated in the return of Charles
de Gaulle to power that was to cause a massive setback for the FLN since, for
example,
If de Gaulle were to follow this [statements of true equality among citizens]
with a massive appeal to the battered, disillusioned but still extant “third
force” of Muslims, then this could only present the FLN. with the gravest
menace to its prestige and war aims.20
While the situation in Algeria was not promising for the FLN, the Turkish public was
sanguine about Algerian independence. One commentator argued that while the
French had not comprehended the fact that the policy of colonization became obso-
































Facing isolation in the international arena due to the constant efforts of de Gaulle to
that end, the FLN decided to intensify the struggle of international recognition, and in
a press conference in Cairo on September 19, 1958, it announced the formation of a
provisional government, the GPRA, with Ferhad Abbas its president. Accordingly,
the Algerian national liberation movement entered a new phase as several states
immediately extended diplomatic recognition, including all the Arab states except
Lebanon, plus China, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Indonesia.22 Another step
was the UN General Assembly debate in December 1958 on a resolution recognizing
the right of the Algerian people to independence and calling for negotiations between
“the two parties”. Even though the resolution failed to obtain the requisite two-thirds
majority, it was considered a considerable success for the GPRA since 34 states sup-
ported it while only nineteen states rejected it; 28 states abstained. Turkey decided to
abstain in the voting.23
Now, it was France’s turn to face isolation in the international arena and so as to
preclude it de Gaulle declared on September 16, 1959 that “after peace had been
restored, Algerians would have a right to self-determination” and his preferred sol-
ution to the Algerian problems was a “government of the Algerians by the Algerians
relying on French assistance and closely united with France”.24 De Gaulle’s propo-
sals were welcomed in France on October 16, the French Parliament passed a vote
of confidence by a huge majority. De Gaulle’s proposals were also welcomed in
the Turkish public. Sami Kohen, a commentator in the daily Milliyet, contended
that de Gaulle’s plan constituted an important step toward the settlement of “the for-
midable” issue insofar as the two parties relinquish a narrow outlook and resolve to
end this dispute with “good will and understanding”.25 On December 12, 1959,
another “Afro-Asian resolution recommending negotiations between Algeria and
France failed in the UN General Assembly by a vote of 35 to eighteen, with 27
abstentions”.26 Turkey again abstained in the voting.27
In May 1960, the Menderes government in Turkey was toppled by a military coup
whose immediate effect on Turkish foreign policy was arguably minimal. “The only
visible foreign policy modification of the military junta was an attempt to improve
relations with the Arab countries, and a desire to establish closer contacts with the
newly emerging nations”.28 Change in the rhetoric of Turkish foreign policy
toward the Third World was visible. Selim Sarper, the new Turkish foreign minister
and also a former Turkish representative to the UN, stated in September 1960
“Turkey belongs to the Asia-Africa bloc and always supports the case of these
nations within its commitments”.29 In addition, the new Turkish government pro-
posed mediation on “the Algerian issue”, which was to be declined by the French
government.30 The Turkish President Cemal Gürsel, on the other hand, in an inter-
view in Cairo, announced that he would support the principle of self-determination
for Algeria.31
In accordance with the policy change, Turkey voted on December 19, 1960 in
favor of the UN General Assembly Resolution 1573 on the Question of Algeria
recognizing the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence,
and “the imperative need for adequate and effective guarantees to ensure the






























successful and just implementation of the right of self-determination on the basis of
respect for the unity and territorial integrity of Algeria”.32 However, this was not a
radical change since Turkey abstained in the voting of a paragraph calling for an inter-
nationally supervised referendum in Algeria, which failed by a single vote.33 Still,
Turkish endorsement of a pro-Algerian position was welcomed by, for example,
the university students from Arab countries studying at İstanbul University who
announced that they followed and approved with great pleasure “the understanding
of right and independence” in Turkish policy toward Algeria.34
Finally, in line with the provisions of the Evian Accords signed by the French gov-
ernment and the GPRA on March 18, 1962, a referendum on the independence of
Algeria was held in June and July 1962 both in France and in Algeria in which elec-
torates voted in favor of independence; a position that was also promoted by the
Turkish media prior to the referendum.35 The GPRA declared July 5 as the day of
independence and with the UN Security Council (176) and General Assembly
(1754) resolutions, Algeria became an independent state, recognized internationally.
Turkish Policy Toward “The Algerian Question” Revisited
Foreign policy of the Menderes government toward the Algerian national liberation
movement, which was to be referred as the Algerian War of Independence, was unan-
imously criticized by commentators of different persuasions and scholars of Turkish
foreign policy. A left-wing author contended in 1968 that the attitude of the leaders of
Democratic Party toward the Algerian problem was utterly “disgraceful” as the
Turkish abstentions in the UN General Assembly, for the author, was tantamount
to align itself with imperialism and capitalism, and was actually “an ideological
betrayal”.36 For two Turkish scholars, it is evident that the attitude of the Menderes
government toward the war of independence Algeria waged against France dealt a
heavy blow to Turkey’s relations with the states of the Middle East region.37 Alger-
ians have been critical of the Turkish policy as well. Ferhad Abbas, the President of
the Algerian Assembly, resentfully told a Turkish journalist in the early 1963 that
Turkey “left them alone in despair” when they needed Turkey’s help the most.38
Even for the subsequent Turkey policy-makers, Turkey’s abstention to lend explicit
diplomatic support to the Algerian position was a mistake. In his visit to Algeria in
February 1985, the Turkish President Turgut Özal publicly criticized the decision
of the Menderes government to abstain in the UN General Assembly votings,
especially that of 1958:
In that time, this sort of a behavior was made. We cannot excuse not behaving
in line with the will of our people. Further, I am of the conviction that accepting
our mistake in that matter is a virtue. My hope is that the eternal friendship rea-
lizes a rapprochement between the governments as well.39
All criticism unequivocally contend that it would have been better, for Turkey or for































Algerian position, especially in the UN General Assembly. However, Turkey’s
heavily and exclusively Western-oriented foreign policy in the aftermath of World
War II made all its relations with non-Western parts of the world conditional on its
relations with the West, whether this was the deliberate policy of Turkish policy-
makers or a spontaneous derivative of Cold War politics. During this period, as
Aydın argues “Turkey’s relations with the Middle Eastern Arab countries, and
Third World states in general, were literally an extension of its Western-dependent
foreign policy”.40 Therefore, the strategic outlook of the Turkish policy-makers
was dominated by the concerns of the Western alliance, rather than by strictly
national concerns. For example, in the London Conference of 1956 convened as a
response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt, Turkey
endorsed US, Britain, and France policies putting it in a difficult position in its
relations with the non-Western world when Britain and France embarked on the
Suez Campaign in late October 1956.41
More important was the consolidation of the propensity in foreign policy thinking
to construe world affairs not from a perspective of national thinking but from a per-
spective of the thinking of “the others”, be them allies or adversaries. This same pro-
pensity was conspicuous in Turkish policy during the Bandung Conference of April
1955. With respect to the Algerian War of Independence, for İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil,
Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in three terms between 1965–71, 1975–77, and
1977–78, in the voting of 1958 Turkey was in a difficult position:
If Turkey had said yes, it would have consented to the separation of the territory
of a NATO member, friend, and allied country, if it had said no, it would have
betrayed its brothers waging a war of independence against the occupier.
Abstaining appeared as the lesser of two evils.42
The underlying reasoning in this statement of a former Turkish Foreign Minister is
characterized by an absence of rational cost–benefit analysis for Turkey’s objectives,
but an analysis in terms of the costs and benefits of others. In short, the Western-
oriented Turkish foreign policy in time became Western-dominated, inducing the
Turkish foreign policy-makers to act in world politics not as Turkish but purely as
Western. On a related point, Aydın asserts that
Turkey’s active role in the creation of such alliances as the Baghdad Pact and
the Balkan Treaty which gained it no additional security and the awkward role
she played at the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in championing the cause of
Westerns powers may all be interpreted as a part of Democratic Party’s efforts
to appear as an indispensable ally in order to secure greater aid from the West.43
This instrumentalist interpretation of the foreign policy of the Menderes government
is, as a matter of fact, cogent. However, Democratic Party’s efforts may also be inter-
preted not for the purpose of appearing as an indispensable ally of the West to secure
greater aid, but for the purpose of fulfilling the exigencies of being Western. In can






























also be argued that the Menderes government conflated the modernization of Turkey
with the westernization of Turkish foreign policy, with the consequent endorsement
of the Western outlook in foreign policy, which seriously conditioned its relations
with the non-Western countries. Another factor, it can be argued that conditioned
Turkish foreign policy toward the non-Western world was the anti-communist ideol-
ogy of the Democratic Party leadership, which also influenced its foreign policy
thinking. According to Aydın, Turkey’s threats to Syria in 1957 to invade “should
the Communists, or the Soviet Union, gain control over the Syrian government”,
among others, was part of its efforts to exacerbate the Communists threat to “get
more economic and military aid as well as the result of the Democratic Party’s
foreign policy thinking, which was essentially anti-Soviet”.44 However, it can be
argued that anti-communism and anti-Sovietism are not completely interchangeable
as Aydın suggests but anti-Soviet foreign policy thinking of the Democratic Party
was in part a derivative of its anti-communist thinking. As Hale contends, in 1957
during the Syrian Crisis “Adnan Menderes had a more Dullesian-than-Dulles
phobia about the dangers of communist penetration in the Middle East, and that
his Western allies had to restrain him from taking a more aggressive stance in the
region”.45
The cumulative effect of these ideational factors arguably generated a binary
understanding of world politics; for the Menderes government, a country was
either with the West, with us, or against the West, against us. Therefore, with refer-
ence to the Algerian War of Independence, France was perceived as a fellow Western
state whose interests should not have been jeopardized. More importantly, this binary
understanding of world politics shaped the foreign policy of the Menderes govern-
ment toward national liberation movements, or in other words, toward the emerging
Third World, and resulted in its persistent condemnation of the policy of neutrality. In
other words, with a binary understanding of world politics, the Menderes government
could not perceive the emergence of a “third” world and thus was unable to adapt its
policies accordingly, and worse yet, its pro-western policies and condemnation of
neutrality was to alienate the emerging Third World, and thereby cause serious set-
backs for the subsequent Turkish foreign policy-makers. Its policy toward the Alger-
ian War of Independence was an example of this hallmark of the general foreign
policy of the Menderes government.
On the other hand, the Algerian War of Independence took place between 1954 and
1962. This was a period between Turkey’s entry into NATO in 1952 and the dispatch
of the infamous letter of the US President Lyndon Johnson in 1964, two temporal
junctures, which arguably characterized the advent and the end of the most
Western-oriented period of Turkish foreign policy in the Cold War. There were a
couple of elements from Turkey’s standpoint, Sander argues, that influenced
Turkey’s entry into NATO, which were the Soviet threat, the Western-oriented
foreign policy, concerns over sustaining economic and military aid, and the preser-
vation of the democratic regime in Turkey.46 In addition to these factors, it can be
argued, Turkey’s entry into NATO not only consolidated the Western-oriented































dependence on the West, but was also construed as the final realization of the long
sought objective of Turkey’s Westernization; Turkey was finally admitted to the
“family” of free Western nations. While NATO membership marked the advent of
the most Western-oriented era of Turkish foreign policy in the Cold War, Johnson’s
letter of 1964 marked the end of it. The letter warned that
your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obli-
gation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which
results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its
NATO allies.47
If the Johnson Letter shook Turkish policy-makers about the probable adverse con-
sequences of the exclusively Western-oriented foreign policy, the UN General
Assembly voting on September 18, 1965 on the Cyprus issue finally awakened
them to the actual adverse consequences of the exclusively Western-oriented
foreign policy. Forty-eight voted against the Turkish position while only six voted
in its favor; 54 states abstained. It was an utter and indisputable evidence of
Turkey’s isolation in world politics. A Turkish scholar commenting on the voting
in December 1965 declared that Turkey woke up from its “sleep of absentminded-
ness” owing to the Cyprus issue.48 In brief, Turkish foreign policy toward the Alger-
ian War of Independence was conditioned by this temporal context with Turkey’s
entry into NATO in 1952 and the Johnson Letter in 1964 its junctures; two temporal
junctures arguably marking the most Western-oriented period of Turkish foreign
policy in the Cold War.
Conclusion
The Menderes government did not extend direct and explicit diplomatic support to
“the Algerian problem” despite the fact that the Turkish public took a visible pro-
Algerian stance. In the related UN General Assembly votings, Turkey voted
against the Algerian position in 1955, while abstaining in 1957, 1958, and 1959.
Even though Turkey voted in favor of Algerian position in four other votings that
took place in February 1957, December 1957, 1960, and 1962, the general perception
in Turkey, and Algeria, and in general the Third World, has been critical of its pro-
French, pro-Western position. One reason is the fact that while all the resolutions
Turkey voted in favor of Algeria passed in the General Assembly, the others
Turkey voted against or abstained failed. The Turkish government after the 1960
coup tried to mend ties with non-Western countries and opted to publicly support
the Algerian positions, especially in the UN General Assembly. In any case, the
common argument has been that there was no excuse for Turkey for its abstention
from lending outright diplomatic support for the “Algerian problem”. However, in
this article, it is argued that the policy attitude of the Menderes government toward
the Algerian War of Independence was extensively conditioned by two non-material
factors. The first was the foreign policy thinking and outlook of the Menderes






























government, especially characterized by a binary understanding of world politics.
The second was the temporal context wherein the Menderes government conducted
its foreign policy. Accordingly, an implicit argument in this paper is that non-material
and ideational factors were influential in shaping the foreign policy of Turkey, and
thus incorporating these factors in analyses of Turkish foreign policy is of import
to achieve a better understanding.
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1959.
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